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associated with within-country rises in inequality. However, some of these factors are
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31 Introduction
Economies that have emerged from the disaggregation of the Soviet Republic have
gone through processes of radical economic and institutional transformations since the 90’s.
These have encompassed globalisation – that is, increased trade and foreign direct
investments (FDI) – regionalisation – namely, increased economic and political integration
with the European Union (EU) – as well as a vast set of reforms of privatisation, and market
and financial liberalisation. All of these processes have been accompanied by a progressive
retreat of the State from its role of direct management of the economy, which was more
pronounced in some countries than in others. At the same time, all these countries
experienced a dramatic rise in income inequality, with the GINI index taking off from some
of the lowest levels in the whole world during the 80’s – around 20% – to levels several
magnitudes higher.
The aim of this paper is to investigate the relationship of these factors with inequality,
and increase the understanding of the underlying causal links. More specifically, we want to
assess the quantitative impact of each of these factors, both in isolation from and in
combination with each other. We shall also seek to compare the experience of countries that
have joined the European Union from those that have not, in order to gauge the possible
relevance of the process of European integration on economic performance. In other words,
we want to assess the relevance of some institutional aspects connected with joining the EU
on controlling inequality – such as the acquisition of better policy instruments on one hand,
and the liberalisation and deregulation processes on the other.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the general trends in economic,
institutional changes and inequality for transition economies (TE). Section 3 reviews the
theoretical and empirical literature on inequality, openness, and institutional change, focussing
on studies on TE. Section 4 reports the results of our econometric analysis and Section 5
concludes.
2 General Trends in Economic, Institutional Changes and Inequality
for Transition Economies
2.1 Evolution of the economic policy framework
During the Soviet period, the trade patterns of those countries that are now known as
TE were highly inward-oriented. For decades, most of these countries constituted at various
4degrees an almost unified trade and investment bloc that functioned separately from, had
different rules from and had limited access to the rest of world markets. Trade was restricted
and regulated by the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA)3, the key central
planning mechanism that decided how the countries traded with each other as well as with
the rest of the world. Under the planning mechanism, imports and exports were co-ordinated
and negotiated through bilateral agreements which obligated the signing governments to trade
with each other specified quantities of particular goods. Prices, expressed in Transferable
Rubles4, were also negotiated at the government-to-government level.
The political disintegration of the Soviet Union leading to the establishment of fifteen
new independent states and the break-up of Yugoslavia into seven states resulted in a
breakdown of the traditional links among economic units located in the territories of the new
states: what had been domestic transaction in the same currency governed by the same laws
became international trade. Therefore, after the break-up of the Soviet Union, one of the
many changes that the TE experienced regarded the reintegration of those countries in the
global economy and the shift form trading patterns established by central plan decisions to
new patterns of trade determined by market forces.
Trade liberalisation has indeed been an integral part of the transition process
undertaken by formerly centrally planned economies at the beginning of 1990s. At the outset
of the transition, trade reforms have focused on measures to encourage and redirect
countries’ exports. In the immediate aftermath of the Soviet Union’s dissolution, in fact, trade
in the region essentially collapsed. This was due to several factors including the break-up of
CMEA and the deep post-transformation recession with the consequent contraction of
domestic demand. The first liberalisation measures consisted of phasing out the state foreign
trade monopoly, allowing registered operators to carry out foreign trade transactions and
freeing their access to foreign currencies for trade purposes. At the same time, most of the
countries started to open, at different degrees, their economies to FDI (OECD, 2001). Even
though substantial differences exist among the TE trade regimes, most of the countries in the
region have now adopted liberal trade policies5. Tariff protection of domestic industry and
agriculture is on average lower in comparison with developing countries (DCs) at similar
3 The CMEA was founded in 1949 by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania and
the Soviet Union.
4 The TR (transferable rubles) was an abstract unit of account, which had no physical presence.
5 Belarus, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, are all characterised by very protectionist regimes, whereas recent
WTO members like Armenia, Croatia, Georgia, the Kyrgyz Republic, and Moldova have very liberal trade
regimes, especially when compared with developing countries at similar levels of per capita income. In between
are some of the larger transition economies such as Russia and Ukraine.
5levels of income and the extent of protection through non-tariff barriers appears to be no
greater (World Bank, 2007).
There is significant diversity also in the extent to which different countries participate in
regional trade agreement with the EU. In this respect, we can divide the TE into two sub-
regional groups.
 EU New Member states (NMS). This includes the ten countries that recently acceded
to the European Union6. All EU NMS have accepted the EU acquis7 in its totality and
the related obligations. These include the adoption of the EU external tariffs and of
all the EU regulations governing external trade, including the preferential agreements
the EU has signed with many countries worldwide. On joining the EU, NMS became
part of the EU single internal market. This means that free movements of goods and
capital introduced already to a considerable extent under the Europe Agreements, is
now fully applicable to all the new Member States.
 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and South-East European (SEE) States.
CIS are those countries that were created from the break-up of the Soviet Union8.
Most of these countries established co-operation links with the EU within the
framework of the ENP and of Partnership and Co-operation Agreements (PCA)9.
The objective of the ENP is to share the benefits of the EU 2004 enlargement with
neighbouring countries. It is also designed to prevent the emergence of new dividing
lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbours. The vision is that of a ring of
countries, drawn into further integration, but without necessarily becoming full
6 In particular, this group includes the eight countries that joined the EU in January 2004 (Czech Republic,
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic and Slovenia) and the two countries that acceded
to the EU in January 2007 (Bulgaria and Romania).
7 The term acquis is used in European Union law to refer the total body of EU laws, rules and regualtions
accumulated so far.
8 This group includes all the countries resulting from the disaggregation of the Soviet Union, except for the
Baltic states. In particular, CIS countries are: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Moldova, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.
9 The ENP covers all the European CIS states (with the exception of Russia) in the Caucasus and Eastern
Europe. When the EU unveiled its ENP, Russia chose not to join, fearful of being dominated by the EU. Russia
aspires to be an "equal partner" of the EU (as opposed to the "junior partnership", as Russia sees the ENP).
Consequently, Russia and the European Union agreed to create four Common Spaces for cooperation in
different spheres. In practice there are no substantial differences (besides naming) between the sum of these
agreements and the ENP Action Plans (adopted jointly by the EU and its ENP partner states). The objective of
the common economic space is to create an open and integrated market between the EU and Russia. This space
is intended to remove barriers to trade and investment The EU’s cooperation objectives with the Central Asian
countries are instead based on the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) in force with Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan and signed with Turkmenistan, and the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA)
with Tajikistan.
6members of the European Union. PCA are basic commercial treaties which establish
the adherence to basic commercial rules and in some cases provide Generalised
System of Preferences treatments (GSP)10. SEE include the three countries – i.e.
Croatia, Macedonia, and Serbia and Montenegro - that were created out of the
disaggregation of Yugoslavia, and which, unlike Slovenia, have not yet joined the EU.
However, these countries are either formal candidates, or have some prospects of
acceding to the EU. With few exceptions, all these countries have already signed
Association Agreements – which involve free trade arrangements in many sectors and
preferential treatments in others – with the EU. For the purpose of our analysis, we
shall consider these two groups as a single entity in the rest of the paper, and we will
refer to them as ‘CIS & SEE’.
2.2 Trade, Institutional Reforms and Inequality Patterns
Trade liberalisation efforts and commercial agreements especially with the EU resulted
in a significant increase of trade flows in the region over the last decade. Figure 1 illustrates
such growth. NMS began with a wider share of trade over GDP than CIS & SEE at the
beginning of the period, but the latter caught up towards the end of the ‘80s11. During the
90s, NMS leapfrogged CIS & SEE in terms of trade share, but the difference is smaller than
at the beginning of the ‘80s. In addition to trade openness, outward economic orientation also
comprises FDI attracted by different countries. Figure 2 shows that since the 90’s the region
has received an increasing amount of FDI. The fact that EUNMS were more capable of
attracting FDI indicates the positive attitude of these countries towards foreign investors and,
in parallel, a positive external assessment of the general economic environment by foreign
investors in host countries.
Figure 3 and 4 plots the patterns for two of the institutional change measures that will
be used in the rest of the paper. Share of workers in the private sector measures the
percentage of workers active in the private vis-à-vis the public sector. It may thus be
considered a measure of the degree of liberalisation in the labour market. This variable
progressively increased over time from a value exactly equal to 0 in CIS & SEE in 1990, and
20% in NMS. The privatisation revenues variable offers a direct appraisal of the magnitude of
10 The GSP is a scheme – proposed by UNCTAD in 1968 – under which industrialised countries would grant
trade preferences to developing countries. The European Community was the first to implement a GSP scheme
in 1971. The EU's GSP grants products imported from GSP beneficiary countries either duty-free access or a
tariff reduction, depending on which of the GSP arrangements a country enjoys.
11 Some caution is needed in the interpretation of these graphs. Trade data for the 80’s do not separate out intra-
Soviet Union trade among regions which later became States. This implies that trade before the ‘80s is
underestimated in the Post-Soviet Union bloc in comparison to the levels of trade in the ‘90s.
7the selling of State enterprises. Even in this case, we can observe a steady upward trend,
which is steeper for the NMS.
Another important feature of the trade patterns in the region is the prominent role of
the EU as the major merchandise export destination and import origin market. Table 1
summarises the evolution of these shares for the different groups of countries. It is
interesting to note that the share of exports going to the EU and of imports coming from the
EU increased for NMS and SEE. However, the initial level of the EU share in merchandise
exports and imports were relatively high. Instead, for CIS countries the EU is neither the
major export destination market, nor the main import origin market. The larger geographic
distance and the slower pace of economic agreements may be the reason for this fact.
Table 1: Directions of trade per region (Shares)
Year Region EU-15 Others Region EU-15 Others
CIS 1993 21.0 46.2 32.8 27.7 42.9 29.4
1996 47.7 32.5 19.8 47.9 28.7 23.4
2000 47.6 33.6 18.8 39.0 33.1 27.9
2003 39.3 39.6 21.1 37.8 34.8 27.4
SEE 1993 30.9 53.9 15.2 22.8 47.9 29.3
1996 27.7 59.3 13 24.3 52.0 23.7
2000 28.4 61.2 10.4 24.6 61.1 14.3
2003 27.9 62.2 9.9 22.2 63.7 14.1
NMS 1993 27.5 61.7 10.8 25.3 62.6 12.1
1996 25.1 65.1 9.8 26.1 64.1 9.8
2000 25.5 65.3 9.2 19.9 68.6 11.5
2003 23.7 65.4 10.9 22.1 67.5 10.4
Share of total world merchandise exports (%) Share of total world merchandise imports (%)
Source: IMF Directions of Trade Statistics (IMF, 2006)
In the same period over the last decades inequality increased significantly in the area.
Figure 5 plots the evolution of the Gini indexes for individual countries (Panels 5a and 5b),
and for the two groups of NMS and CIS & SEE (Panel 5c). All TE started in the 80’s with
extremely low levels of inequality. In nearly all the countries for which data are available,
GINI indexes were below 30% before the 90’s. The rise in inequality in the subsequent years
has been dramatic. Countries such as Romania, Bulgaria, and Belarus, seemed to have
experienced an extremely steep upward trend in inequality, which in some cases have been
concentrated in few years. In some other countries, like Poland and Macedonia, the upward
trend has been spread over the years. In a few countries, like Armenia, Albania, and Belarus,
the evolution of inequality seems to follow an inverse-U pattern akin to a Kuznets curve, in
spite of the time spanned by our dataset being very short. Figure 5c shows clearly that CIS &
SEE countries ended up on average with a significantly higher level of inequality than NMS
8during the 2000s. Section 4.5 seeks to establish whether this is due to the action of a specific
mechanism or to a more general governance failure in the former group of countries.
9Figure 1: Evolution of Total Trade as a percentage of GDP per region Figure 2: Evolution of FDI as a percentage of GDP per region
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2007)
Note: GDP expressed in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP)
Source: FDI/TNC Database, UNCTAD (2007)
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Figure 3: Employees in Private Sector as a Share of Total Employees per region Figure 4: Privatisation Revenues as a Percentage of GDP per region
Source: Authors’ elaborations from WDI (World Bank, 2007)
Note: GDP expressed in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP)
Source: FDI/TNC Database, UNCTAD (2007)
Note: GDP in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP)
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Figure 5a: Evolution of Gini Index per country – NMS region Figure 5b: Evolution of Gini Index per country – CIS & SEE region
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Figure 5c: Evolution of Gini Index per region Source: WIID/WIDER (2007) and EHII/UTIP *Galbraith and Kum, 2003)
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3 Theoretical and empirical background
This section outlines the theoretical and empirical background for the econometric
analysis of section 4. First, we focus on the theoretical mechanisms linking international
openness with wage inequality. We broaden the standard Heckscher-Ohlin (HO)
framework to allow for differences in the technologies adopted by countries. Section 3.2
describes the theoretical role played by other factors in shaping the inequality outcome in
the region. Transition countries underwent in fact radical changes in their political and
economic structure and it is thus important to consider the role of what we refer to as
‘institutional factors’ as well. In what follows we consider the process of privatisation,
labour market liberalisation and price liberalisation. Finally, section 3.3 presents the
results of some previous empirical works aiming at identifying the various causes of the
recent rise in income inequality in TE.
3.1 International openness and inequality
3.1.A Global or local validity of the Stolper Samuelson theorem?
The standard model used by economists to analyse the effect of trade on the relative
returns to different factors of production is the HO model, which builds on the
Ricardian theory of comparative advantages by predicting patterns of trade and
production based on the factor endowment of a trading region. In its simplest version, as
reported in Wood (1994), the model assumes two factors of production – skilled and
unskilled labour12 - and two countries, the North (developed countries) and the South
(developing countries), each producing two goods (skilled and unskilled labour-
intensive). Other assumptions in the model are perfectly competitive markets and
identical production functions with freely available technology across countries. The
related predictions in terms of the distributive consequences of trade openness are well
known and have often been invoked to justify trade liberalisation in the developing
countries. According to what is also known as the Stolper-Samuelson (SS) theorem,
greater openness should increase the relative demand and prices for unskilled labour and
lead to a less unequal distribution of wages in low and middle income/low-skilled labour-
abundant countries.
12 Wood (1994) justifies the omission of capital and land from the skilled-unskilled labour model, arguing
that “machines and raw materials are internationally traded with low transport costs, buildings are reproducible and financial
flows tend to equalize interest and profit rates. Apart from infrastructure, labour is, thus, the only internationally immobile
factor of production. [...] The North South difference in relative supply of the two distinct immobile factors (skilled and
unskilled labour) provides the main basis for international trade” [Wood, 1994: pp 41].
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However, some important critiques have been levelled towards the HO theoretical
framework. In particular it has been argued that the HO model and the SS theorem are
based on several assumptions that are too restrictive to describe the real world (e.g. Cline,
1997). If the model is generalised to account for (a) several countries – rather than just
two - at different stages of development, and for (b) these countries adopting different
technologies, then the distributional consequences of trade become unpredictable and
may differ from those one would anticipate on the basis of a simplistic North-South
interpretation of the SS theorem.
Even retaining the central assumptions of the HO model, the inclusion of many
countries implies that factor abundance should be assessed in relation not to the world as
a whole, but only with respect to the group of countries that have similar endowment
proportions and produce the same ranges of goods. These countries are said to
constitute a ‘cone of diversification’ (Davis, 1996). What matters for the distributive
consequences of trade liberalisation is the relative position of the country amongst the
other countries within its own cone. In fact, a developing country may be considered as
“unskilled abundant” in global terms, but this may not be true in relation to other DCs.
If factor abundance is defined in a local sense, the distributional consequences of trade
can be the exact opposite of what we expect in a traditional HOSS framework.
This argument is particularly important for middle-income countries (MIC), such as
most of TE which are likely to be relatively unskilled-labour-abundant in comparison
with high-income trading partners and relatively skilled-labour-abundant in comparison
with low-income ones. Thus, when TE opened to trade, they had to face the competition
of labour-intensive manufacturing from low-wage labour-abundant low-income
countries, and this may affect and change their comparative advantages in labour
intensive exports13. Indeed, in this context trade liberalisation may cause the contraction
of either highly skilled-intensive sectors (replaced by imports from DCs) or of unskilled-
intensive sectors (replaced by imports from low income countries), so that the overall
impact of liberalisation cannot be determined a priori.
13 Wood (1997) proposes this argument to explain the dramatic increase of income inequality that Latin
American countries have experienced starting from the mid-80s. Cornia (2003), too, underlines the
importance of this argument in explaining the increase in inequality that many MIC have experienced
during the 90s. He stresses that, as a consequence of the entry into the world market of low-skill
manufactures from China, Indonesia and other exporters with substantially low wages, the formal sector of
MIC “no longer has a comparative advantage in labour-intensive exports and either it informalises its
production via a long chain of subcontracting agreements or shifts production towards skill-intensive
exports. In both cases, wage inequality is likely to worsen” [Cornia, 2003, p.605].
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Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1997) extend this argument and develop a model where
there is a continuum of goods ordered along a ladder whose steps are characterised by
different levels of skill intensity. The model assumes the production of a simple final
good that requires a continuum of intermediary goods with varying proportions of skilled
and unskilled labour. They assume that the developing region has a comparative
advantage in the unskilled labour intensive stages of the production, whilst the developed
region is more efficient in the skilled labour intensive parts. Investment and trade
liberalisation would shift the production of intermediate inputs (through trade and FDI)
form developed to developing countries. While such products would be characterised as
unskilled-labour-intensive from a developed country perspective, they appear to be
skilled-labour-intensive from a DC point of view. In this way, the average skill intensity
and skilled labour demand increase both in the North and in the South, inducing a rise in
the skill premium in both areas.
These models – Davis (1996), Feenstra and Hanson (1996) – are directly derived from
the HO and SS approach, since they borrow the central idea that the return to factors of
production is conditional on their relative distribution among countries (Arbache, 2001).
However, they stress that factor endowments and factor intensity are relative concepts.
Other theoretical streams of literature depart radically from the HOSS framework by
relaxing the key HO assumption of identical technologies among countries and
considering the dynamic effects of trade.
3.1.B The role of technology
If the hypothesis of identical technologies among countries is dropped and one
assumes that developed countries and DCs differ in their technology levels and that
openness facilitates technology diffusion from North to South, then the final impact of
trade in terms of demand for labour and relative wages also depends on the skill intensity
of the transferred technology relative to that currently in use. There are many empirical
studies showing the skill-biased nature of technological change in the developed
economies (see, for instance, Berman et al. 1994; Autor et al. 1998; Machin and Van
Reenen, 1998; Piva and Vivarelli, 2002 and 2004). Without necessarily assuming that
developed countries transfer their “best” technologies to the DCs, it is quite reasonable
to expect that transferred technologies are relatively skill-intensive, i.e. more skill-
intensive than those in use domestically before trade liberalisation. Indeed, to the extent
that technology upgrading is linked to international openness, trade liberalisation may
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increase the demand for skilled labour in DCs too, reversing the prediction of the SS
theorem.
Robbins (1996 and 2003) has called the effect of in-flowing technology resulting from
trade liberalization the ‘skill-enhancing trade (SET) hypothesis’. His idea is that trade
liberalization accelerates the flow of physical capital (and embodied technology) to the
South, inducing rapid adaptation to the modern skill-intensive technologies currently
used in the North. The resulting increased demand for skilled labour may then lead to a
widening of wage and income dispersion in DCs.
There is an extensive literature stressing that economic opening may in fact expose
DCs to new ideas and technologies (see e.g. Keller, 2001, and Hoeckman and Javoricik,
2006). Different channels have been identified as key vehicles of technological transfer.
We focus here on import, export and FDI channels14.
Import flows can contribute to the international transfer of technology by providing
DCs’ local firms access to new embodied technologies and by creating opportunities for
reverse engineering. Many recent contributions have analysed empirically how imports act as
a channel for transferring technologies and knowledge affecting productivity and
fostering technological change (see for example, Coe and Helpman, 1995; Coe et al.,1997;
Mayer, 2000; and Barba-Navaretti and Solaga, 2002).
Exports may also induce productivity growth and technological upgrading. One
reason lays in the learning-by-exporting argument, according to which exporting causes
efficiency gains. Breaking into foreign markets allows firms to acquire knowledge of
international best practice. Moreover, foreign buyers often provide their supplier with
technical assistance and product design in order to improve the quality of imported
goods, and they may transmit to their supplier located in DCs the tacit knowledge
acquired from other suppliers located in advanced countries. The second mechanism is
based on the quality-upgrading argument: exporters may be pressured by their foreign
clients to produce according to quality standards that are higher than those prevailing in
the domestic market. In this sense, export activity may lead to an upgrading of average
product quality, which in turn generates demand for a better qualified workforce.
FDI are also very important channels for the international technology diffusion. The
theories of Multinational Enterprises generally emphasize the importance of technology
as a firm’s specific advantage that is to be exploited above. Hymer (1976) has been one
of the first contributions to point out the idea that FDI represent not simply a transfer of
14 Other channels are the direct trade in knowledge through technology purchase or licensing and the
labour turnover and movement of people.
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capital, but also the transfer of a “package” in which capital, management, and new
technology are all combined. Indeed, FDI can be important conduits for the transfer of
technology in terms of both the more productive techniques embodied in the capital
goods and the upgrading of the skills of the local labour force. They can hence facilitate
the transfer of knowledge to technologically backwards countries that would need several
times to produce the same technology independently.
3.2 Institutional Factors and Inequality
There are three mechanisms of what may be considered ‘institutional’ factors that will
be considered as possible causes of inequality in the next section. These are privatisation,
product market liberalisation, and labour market liberalisation.
3.2.A The Impact of Privatisation
As for the former factor, Edwards (2006) uses a neo-classical framework to discuss
the distributional consequences of the privatisation process. The thrust of the model is
the over-capitalisation of the economy at the expense of consumption, due to the policy-
makers objectives of steady industrial expansion. The readjustment following this
inefficient allocation of resources should lead to a fall of capital and, in the presence of
full employment, to a fall in output, too. The impact on income distribution between
capital-owners and wage-earners is however difficult to determine. On the one hand, the
fall in capital should reduce the marginal productivity of labour – and thus gross wage
rates should also fall. On the other hand, the shutting down of inefficient activities and
the lower capital depreciation should free resources in the economy and reduce taxation,
so that net wages may in fact rise. The picture is further complicated by the fact that
scrapped capital may be reinvested abroad, thus increasing the income share accruing to
capital-owners. The exact magnitude and direction of these distributional changes are
thus difficult to quantify, as they ultimately depend on the structure of the economy both
before and after the reforms.
Another class of models describe the privatisation process as correcting misallocations
of capital across sectors. The transfer of capital from formerly protected sectors to more
efficient ones should in principle be beneficial to the economy and to wages (Edwards,
2006). This is particularly true when the heavily subsidised energy sector had a large
weight in the economy (Gros and Jones, 1991). Other models arrive at opposite
conclusions for the short run by removing the assumption of costless factor mobility
(Blanchard, 1997, Castanheira & Roland, 2000). Privatisation reforms are typically
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modelled as the cutting back of a formerly subsidised sector, which is progressively
replaced by a higher-productivity sector. Due to factor mobility costs and other
adjustment frictions, though, the factors laid off in the inefficient sector cannot find
immediate reemployment in the other sector. This further compounds the economy
growth rate due to Keynesian multiplier effects. Consequently, the transition will be
characterised by a marked recession and high unemployment. These short-run costs are
nevertheless going to be reversed in the long run by higher wage and GDP levels.
Edwards (2006) builds on both approaches, and proposes a more sophisticated model
characterised by heterogeneous firms. Its main idea is that under the Soviet-style planned
economy soft budget constraints and lack of competition allowed firms to produce even
when de facto they were making losses. The result was that more efficient firms indirectly
subsidised the running of firms that could not break even. Privatisation reforms are thus
modelled as the introduction of a system whereby firms that do not break even are shut.
Under some assumptions over the capital-labour elasticity of substitution, this reform has
non-neutral distributional effects. Abstracting away from reallocation adjustment costs,
the more efficient firms will expand employment and production, whereas the least
efficient firms will shut. Under efficient labour markets, it is demonstrated that these
adjustment will bring about a fall in real gross wages. Even in this case, whether net
wages and net domestic production actually decrease depends on capital depreciation and
on the scope for re-investing capital abroad. The numerical simulations conducted point
to a permanent fall in workers’ income as a result of privatisation in most cases, so that a
sizeable redistribution of income to the new capital-owners is likely to occur. The author
also points out that this result is more likely to obtain in economies such as the CIS,
where trade is costly, labour is scattered in remote communities and old, Soviet
monopolies are harder to be replaced. NMS may instead enjoy the advantages on output
of attracting FDI from abroad – particularly Western Europe.
3.2.B The Impact of Labour Market Liberalisation
While the theoretical account of the impact of privatisation focused on the functional
distribution of income among capital-owners and wage-earners, approaches studying the
influence of labour market reforms concentrate on earnings inequality. Indeed, many
scholars argue that the most important force driving inequality upwards has been the
increased inequality in labour earnings. This increase seems to derive both from a
widening in the dispersion of wages and from the growth of non-wage incomes
associated with self employment and entrepreneurial activities. On the one hand, the
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emergence of the private sector has changed the process of wage setting by introducing a
tighter link between productivity and wages, causing a departure from the highly
compressed wage structure in place during the Soviet Union period.
A general rise in the returns to education following liberalisation also seems to have
played a central role in the growth of wage dispersion. This is true especially for Central
and Eastern Europe and the Baltic states. Rising educational premiums seem to have
played only a minor role in the CIS, probably because of the low market value of the
stock of knowledge inherited from the Soviet Union.
However Cornia (1996) stresses that other factors significantly contributed to the
increased wage dispersion. Earnings inequality appears to have risen also because of the
fall in the minimum wage, the expansion of a highly inequitable informal sector,
mounting wage arrears, and a surge of inter-industry wage dispersion which favoured
workers in politically influential sectors and penalised workers in sectors like health,
education and agriculture.
Moreover, the share of self employment and entrepreneurial incomes has grown in all
TE, due to the elimination of legal restrictions on private ownership and activities. This
increase was about 5 to 10 percent in Central and Eastern Europe (with the exception of
Poland) and the Baltic states, 20 to 35 in Russia, Moldova and Ukraine and more than 50
percent in the poorest republics of the Caucasus and Central Asia (World Bank, 2000a).
These new sources of income are associated with greater inequality, since – unlike wages
– are “critically tied to an individual’s access to assets (including knowledge and
information) and are thus often conditioned by initial assets or incomes” (World Bank,
2000a, p. 153).
Boeri and Terrel (2002) emphasize the role of labour markets institutions in
determining different distributive outcomes in Central and Eastern European Countries
(CEECs) and CIS. In the CEECs the explosion of wage inequality has been in fact
mitigated by institutions imposing wage floors. This has implied in the CEECs a greater
employment rather than wage adjustment compared with the CIS, where labour market
adjustments basically occurred through price rather than quantity.
3.2.C The Impact of Price Liberalisation
Another factor contributing to the increase in inequality after the transition has
been the high inflation rate which followed the prices liberalisation. Nearly all socialist
economies (with the exception of Czechoslovakia) embarked on the process of transition
with a substantial monetary overhang. Thus where prices were liberalised they jumped
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up, sometimes by factors of two or three (Flemming and Micklewright, 2000). This
caused the erosion of real values of the arrears on pension and social benefits in several
countries. Since the arrears were mostly concentrated in the bottom part of the
distribution, the high inflation resulted in the cut of real wages in a highly inequality-
enhancing fashion (Mitra and Yemstov, 2006). Finally, the significant fall of output
during the first years of transition determined a decline of the revenues from collected
taxes. This decline, associated with the increasing needs of the still state-funded social
protection, resulted in a great increase of poverty among the most vulnerable social
groups.
3.3 Empirical Evidence for Transition Economies
Surprisingly enough, the role of globalisation, trade (and investment)
liberalisation in shaping the dynamics of income distribution during the transition is an
issue that received considerably little attention within economic analysis. Possibly because
of lack of data, to the best of our knowledge no empirical work has assessed the impact
of globalisation on TE as a whole.
Cornia and Kiiski (2001) evaluate the impact of liberalisation reforms on WCII
over a sample of 32 developing and transitional economies for the years 1980–95. The
paper is not centred on TE, but some conclusions may all the same be drawn. They
derive a synthetic index of policy reforms which also includes trade liberalisation
measures. They then regress the variation of this index over the changes in income
inequality. The regression analysis tentatively suggests that while the reform package had
an overall inequality-enhancing effect, this was more pronounced in the economies of the
former Soviet bloc (but not of Central Europe), probably because of their institutional
weakness and the lower quality of the policies introduced. This general result suggests
that the impact of globalisation might vary according to the economic and institutional
development of the opening countries.
In fact, as we stressed above, liberalisation reforms may worsen income distribution
if the increased trade flows and outsourcing entail a technological upgrading which may
shift the relative demand of labour towards more skilled workers. Moreover, when TE
opened their economy to global markets they had to face the competition from both
low-wage countries characterised by low production costs and from more efficient firms
in the developed countries. This has caused the closure of many domestic firms with
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negative consequences in terms of employment which are more likely to harm unskilled
labour. However, in countries with relative good institutions, absorption capacity and
economic development – like many CEECs countries – aperture may also offer new
opportunities to catch-up with the developed world, to generate new jobs and to
redistribute economic gains.
According to this line of argument, the descriptive work by Yudaeva (2002)
presents different stylised facts to show that the quality of institutions is an important
factor affecting the results of globalisation in TE. She argues that, according to the
traditional trade theory, trade liberalisation should lead to an increase in incomes of
exporting sectors and a decrease in income in those sectors where import progressively
substitutes domestic production. In this way globalisation can raise inequality by
increasing the wedge between incomes in the two sectors. This process seems to be
particularly harmful for countries characterised by weak institutions, since they are not
able to redirect their exports from the extractive sectors to manufacturing industries, as
the CIS experience reveals. In this sense, she argues that CIS countries – in contrast to
active ‘globalisers’, like CEECs – have ‘globalised’ “passively”. Trade flows did actually
increase in CIS, but – due to poor contract enforcement – manufacturing production has
failed to become an export sector. This led to a bias in the economy towards over-
expansion of the natural resources extraction sectors. Yudeava presents detailed evidence
revealing that in resource-rich countries, such as Kazakhstan, other industrial sectors
rather than oil have almost disappeared since the beginning of transition. Resource-poor
countries, like Armenia, have instead experienced a substantial increase in the share of
agriculture in GDP. The common thread is that bad institutions created obstacles to
exports and therefore to the production of more complex industrial goods, intensifying
the de-industrialisation of their economy. As it is stressed also by Mihaly (2006), the
growing and practically uncontrolled exports of oil, diamonds and different raw materials
facilitated capital flight, which provided enormous benefits to the new business elite in
the resource-rich countries. Moreover, in CIS countries income inequality between the
exporting and importing sectors is not compensated by inter-sectoral labour mobility or a
well functioning social security system.
Mynbaev et al. (2006) show that in Kazakhstan wages in mining, gas and other
mineral resource sectors – which are the sectors responsible for the bulk of exports and
the main recipient of FDI – are the highest. They argue that trade liberalisation has
worsened income distribution by increasing the wage gap between workers employed in
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exporting and non-exporting sectors. By the same token, globalisation seems to have
increased the gender wage gap because of the low mobility of women into the highly paid
positions in western oblasts15 and mining sectors created by FDI and fostered by exports.
Their econometric estimates also reveal that FDI had a positive inequality-enhancing
impact on the skill gap and interpret this result as evidence in favour of the SBTC
hypothesis.
Evidence for CEECs countries is more abundant than for CIS, although even in
this case the focus is often on specific countries rather than on the whole group. Egger
and Stehrer (2003) study the effects of trade in both intermediate and final goods and of
multinational presence on the skilled-to-unskilled labour wage-bill ratio in 14 2-digit
manufacturing industries in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland over the 1993-1999
period. They find that both intermediate goods exports and imports exhibit a positive
impact on the unskilled workers' wage bill in absolute terms as well as relative to the
wage bill of the skilled workers. However, their results also show that the final goods
exports have a negative significant effect on the absolute and relative wage bill of the
unskilled workers, and this effect is greater than the positive effect of intermediate
exports. This indicates that final goods production is more skill-intensive than
intermediate goods production. Since trade in intermediate inputs is generally associated
with vertical FDI, the authors argue that outsourcing in CEECs uses unskilled workers
more intensively and argue that this result is consistent with the expectation of the
standard HO trade theory (see section 3.1.A). Their results also show that the increase in
the share of multinational firms does not have any significant impact on the relative wage
bill.
Bruno et al. (2004) analyse the impact of globalisation on the same three
countries, but focusing only on the role played by FDI. In particular, they investigate
whether and to what extent the increasing inflow of FDI has affected wage inequality by
changing the composition of labour demand between skilled and unskilled workers in the
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. Their results show that in the Czech Republic and
Hungary, FDI do not exert a significant impact on the relative demand for skilled labour.
However when they estimate a wage equation, they find that FDI have a positive and
significant impact on the skill premium. They conclude that FDI did not contribute to
worsen wage inequality on the quantity side, i.e. through favouring relative demand shifts.
15 The oblasts are the administrative units according to which Kazakhstan is divided. The share of foreign
capital vary significantly across the oblasts. The western oblasts are those where the foreign capital share
and average wages are the highest.
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However, FDI impacted on the price side, by affecting the rise in the skill premium
through the active role played by multinational firms in the general process of economic
transformation that characterised the transition towards the market. This has pushed the
labour market from a compressed and rigid wage structure towards forms of wage
determination more typical of a decentralised market economy. For Poland the scarce
effect of FDI on relative labour demand is confirmed, while evidence does not support a
direct effect of FDI on the skill premium. The authors think that this result is probably
due to the slower pace of the transition to a market economy that characterised this
country in comparison with the Czech Republic and Hungary.
However, this finding is not corroborated by the study of Skuratowicz (2001)
who finds that in Poland FDI have worsened wage distribution by increasing wage
differentials between skilled and unskilled workers. Another analysis of the Polish case
carried out by Goh and Javorcik (2005), though, shows that income inequality declined in
Poland after trade liberalisation. They use firm-level data to examine the impact of tariff
changes on the industry wage structure. The analysis of Poland’s trade reforms during the
1990s reveals that the country embarked on a rapid process of trade liberalisation in
preparation to accession to the EU. According to their results, a decrease in an industry
tariff was associated with higher wages being earned by workers employed in that
industry, controlling for worker characteristics and geographic variables. The positive
relationship between tariff declines and wage increases is explained arguing that trade
liberalisation led to increased competitive pressures in industries, forcing firms to
restructure and improve their productivity. This mechanism is particularly stringent in the
context of a transition economy, like Poland, where local firms were sheltered from any
kind of competition until 1990. Increased productivity at the firm level then resulted in
higher wages. Since liberalisation in Poland was more pronounced in industries with
larger shares of unskilled labour, they conclude that trade reforms increased the returns
to unskilled workers relative to skilled workers, contributing to a decline in inequality.
As far as institutional factors are concerned, the empirical literature is even
scanter than that analysing the impact of globalisation. According to Milanovic (1998)
higher dispersion of wages was the main factor behind the increased inequality in
transition countries and was responsible for the rise of between 3.5 and 8 Gini points in
Eastern Europe up to 15 points in Russia. A number of studies indicate that the returns
to education increased substantially in the transition period (e.g. Rutwoski (1996) for
Poland; Jones and Kato (1997) for Bulgaria; Sorm and Terrel (2002) for the Czech
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Republic; Pastore and Verashchagina (2006) for Belarus; Delteil et al. (2004) for
Hungary). Fleisher et al. (2004) underline that such increase was especially sharp in the
early years of transition.
In sum, the empirical works reviewed here do not provide clear evidence on the
link between international openness and income inequality in the transition countries.
However, they suggest that a sudden liberalisation could be harmful for the most
vulnerable groups of population if not accompanied by the building of domestic
capacities
4 Econometric Analysis of Determinants of Inequality in Transition
Economies
4.1 The Econometric Specification
The aim of this section is to illustrate and discuss the empirical model we use to
estimate the determinants of inequality in TE. In particular, we are interested in
identifying the specific role played by both globalization and institutional factors. Our
sample comprises the 10 NMS, the 12 CIS countries plus 3 SEE States16. The temporal
length of the database, which starts in the 1990 and ends in 2004, enables us to gather a
decent number of observations within each country – although even in this case lack of
observations prevent in most cases to have a complete series of data.
Our econometric specification is expressed as follows:
  
k
ititkktitiiit XINSTITGLOBGINI  1,21,1 (1)
where i and t denote country and time period, respectively; GINI is the Gini Index;
GLOB is a set of globalization variables (alternatively imports, exports and FDI as a
share of GDP); INSTIT is a set of institutional variables (alternatively privatisation
revenues as percentage of GDP, private employment as percentage of total employment,
private employment as percentage of GDP); all these regressors take on a value lagged of
one year to address possible problems of co-causation and endogeneity.
16 However, in most cases, lack of data considerably reduces the sample size.
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kX is a set of control variables that will be discussed below; i is the idiosyncratic
individual and time-invariant country’s fixed effect and it the usual error term. All
variables are expressed in natural logarithms. All standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity using the Huber–White correction.
Since we are interested in the within-country dimension of inequality, we shall use a
Lest Square Dummy Variable (LSDV) estimator which relies on the variability of data
within-country. Therefore, the influence of the various independent variables has to be
understood as taking place over time within a country, rather than across countries. The
use of an LSDV estimator allows us to wipe out all time-invariant country-specific
characteristics that are likely to affect the inequality patterns. Moreover, the use of the
LSDV estimator overcomes the possible problems in data comparability across countries
(see below).
All the series used in the regressions have been tested for unit root using the test
developed by Maddala and Wu (1999)17. This is a non-parametric panel data unit root test
which is based on N independent tests on the N individuals and combines the observed
significance levels. The test assumes that all series are non-stationary under the null
hypothesis against the alternative that at least one series in the panel is stationary. In our
case, we always reject the null hypothesis of unit root at the one percent level of
significance.
Although our dynamic specification permits us to ignore time invariant factors, we
still have to include some time-varying controls. Firstly, the dynamics of within-country
income inequality can be affected by per-capita GDP levels, that is, by the stage of
development of a given economic system. According to Kuznets (1955), the relationship
between inequality and economic development follows an inverted-U pattern with
inequality rising at the initial stages of development and then falling. Kuznets’s original
model manly looks at the early stages of a country’s development and industrialisation,
and explains the downward trend in terms of migration from the rural/agricultural to the
urban/industrialised sector. A similar mechanism has been recently applied to developed
and MICs. The factors underlying the rising and decreasing trends in inequality are in this
case an SBTC and the ensuing rise in skilled labour supply triggered by the skill premium
increase (e.g. Aghion et al, 1999; Aghion and Howitt, 1997). Empirically, Sukiassyan
(2007) finds evidence supporting a Kuznets dynamics being at work in TE. Barro (2000)
17 The test has been implemented in Stata using the xtfisher command developed by Scott Merryman.
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also supports the Kuznets hypothesis in a larger sample of countries. We have thus
inserted both a linear and a quadratic term of GDP per capita in our specification.
Secondly, education should also be taken into account as an important factor
mediating the impact of our explanatory variables on inequality. The introduction of this
variable also allows us to test the theories illustrated in section 3. An increase in
education should imply an increase in the skilled labour supply, a decrease in the relative
skilled/unskilled wage and an overall decrease in income inequality. A steady increase in
the supply of skilled labour might keep the relative skilled/unskilled wages constant, even
in the presence of skill-biased technological change. However, different mechanisms may
be at work. A country’s absorptive capacity (Arrow, 1969; Abramovitz, 1986; Verspagen,
1991) – which is partly determined by the skill level in the workforce – may be an
important factor in activating FDI and technology flows. This may lead to a positive
correlation between human capital and inequality. These contrasting implications are
tested in the next sections.
4.2 Description of the dataset
The data used in the analysis originate from different sources that have been
merged in an original and unique database. The sources for the data for inequality are the
WIDER-WIID18 (World Institute for Development Economics Research, 2007) and the
Estimated Household Income Inequality (Galbraith and Kum (2003)) datasets. All
observations for the Gini index within each country come from the same source and the
same measurement, which ensures the direct comparability of inequality across time
within each country. For most of the countries, the Gini index is calculated over labour
earnings. However, different sources have been used across countries, which prevent the
full cross-country comparability of these measures. Table 3 in the Appendix gives the
complete list of countries, reports the initial, final, and mean values for the GINI index,
as well as its change in the period considered, and the income definition used in each
country. Data on international trade (import and export) and data on GDP are gathered
from the World Development Indicators (WDI) (World Bank, 2007). In order to identify
trade patterns with the EU and DCs separately, we also use the IMF Direction of Trade
Statistics database (2006). Data on the institutional and economic policy variables are
taken form the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) dataset.
18 The WIID is the World Income Inequality Database, developed by the WIDER (the World Institute for
Development Economic Research, based at United Nation University in Helsinki).
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Finally, data on schooling are gathered from the Barro-Lee database (See Barro and Lee,
1996 and 2001), which provides information on educational attainment over five-year
intervals19. We construct a measure of skill for the workforce of each country as the ratio
between the number of workers with secondary education and the sum of workers with
primary or no education. In order to match these data with our annual observations on
inequality, we interpolated the data available, under the hypothesis that the yearly increase
is constant over time for the missing periods.
Summary statistics of the data included in the regressions are presented in Table
2.
Table 2 : Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs. Mean
Std.
Dev. Min Max
GINI INDEX 254 32.81 7.94 16.00 57.93
FDI (%GDP) 342 2.81 4.36 -0.17 46.02
IMPORTS(%GDP) 339 49.45 17.35 12.99 93.27
EXPORTS(%GDP) 339 43.02 17.19 7.22 90.76
PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT SHARE 325 47.20 23.95 5.00 80.00
PRIVATISATION REVENUES (GDP SHARE) 296 5.45 7.15 0.00 35.10
PRIVATE SECTOR VALUE ADDED SHARE 205 55.75 20.24 0.00 81.40
HUMAN CAPITAL 153 0.81 0.49 0.16 1.91
GDP PER CAPITA (PPP) 346 7292 3938 1220 19244
4.3 The Inequality-Globalisation Link
Table 4 confirms the relevance of the globalisation link in accounting for the rising
trend of inequality in TE. In the specification each component – export, import, and
FDI – is strongly significant in predicting the level of inequality (Table 4: column 1, 3, 5).
Of the three factors, import is the variable having the strongest impact on inequality,
whereas FDI has the least strong effect.
In order to understand the relationship between the globalisation variables and
inequality, we have included in the regressions the interaction terms of these three
variables with our human capital index. This consists of the ratio between the share of
the workforce having acquired secondary education and those having acquired primary
or no education at all. The inclusion of this index restricts the analysis to 9 out of 20
countries, so the results are not closely comparable to those illustrated above. In spite of
19 In particular, the data used here refer to the educational attainment of the population aged 25 and over.
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this, the three variables maintain a significant and positive sign when they enter directly
the regression.
Interestingly enough, the interaction term between the globalisation variables and the
human capital index is positive for all them, significant for FDI, and strongly significant
for Exports and Imports. This implies that the inequality-enhancing effect of either
variable is magnified as the other variables increases. In this regression, the overall impact
on inequality of a variable X is given by  ZYXX int  , where X is the coefficient for
the direct impact of the variable X, ZX int is the coefficient for the interacted term, and
Z is the values taken by the variable with which X has been interacted. In order to
quantify exactly the impact of a variable on inequality, we have to consider the maximum
and minimum values of the variable with which it has been interacted.
Figure 6 offers a diagrammatical representation of this exercise for the
globalisation variables and the human capital index. Figure 6a plots the value of the
impact of each globalisation variable – namely,  HKGLOBHKGLOB int  , where GLOB
= {EXPORT, IMPORT, FDI} - at the minimum, mean, and maximum value that the
human capital index takes in our sample. This Figure clearly shows the presence of
different effects of globalisation in relation to different degrees of human capital. For all
of the three globalisation variables considered, the impact of increases of globalisation on
inequality is negative (positive) at low (high) levels of human capital. For levels of human
capital close to its mean, the impact of globalisation is greater than zero, particularly for
Imports. It is also apparent that trade variables appear to have a stronger impact on
inequality than FDI. Figure 6b shows the impact of human capital for varying degrees of
the three globalisation variables – namely, it plots the
coefficient  GLOBGLOBHKHK int  . The human capital index appears to have an
inequality-enhancing effect at almost all of the globalisation levels. Only for an apparently
small region where imports and exports are close to their minimum levels does human
capital have a negative impact on inequality.
These findings point to a coexistence of the various theoretical ideas outlined in
section 3.1. The change of sign in the impact of globalisation indicates that the
implications of the SS theorem hold when a country is relatively poor in human capital.
On the contrary, the arguments underlying the skill-enhancing trade hypothesis, the
learning-by-exporting hypothesis, and – to a more limited degree – the technological
spillovers associated with multinational activities, seem to hold at high levels of human
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capital. This suggests the possible existence of a structural break in the economy
associated with different levels of absorptive capacity (Arrow, 1969; Abramovitz, 1986;
Verspagen, 1991). When a country’s absorptive capacity – in terms of human capital - is
low, then it is plausible that trade and FDI occur within unskilled-intensive sectors of the
economy, thus benefiting unskilled workers. However, when a country’s skilled
workforce exceeds a minimal threshold, then it is possible that the increased absorptive
capacity induces an SBTC through trade and FDI channels, which has an inequality-
enhancing effect20.
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Figure 6a: Impact of Globalisation on
Inequality at varying levels of Human Capital
Figure 6b: Impact of Human Capital on
Inequality at varying levels of Globalisation
Figure 6: Joint impact on inequality of globalisation variables and human capital
The picture that emerges from our analysis for our sample of TE is thus one of a
double ‘regime’ of globalisation, associated with a threshold in human capital. This
picture is nevertheless to be complemented with the overall positive impact of human
capital on inequality that we also observe. This result is generally not predicted by the
theories outlined in section 3.1. In fact, the emphasis of these theories is mainly on
increases in skilled-labour demand triggered by an SBTC, and the consequent rise in
relative wages that it brings about. Within this context, increases in human capital should
be associated with rises in skilled labour supply, thus they should have an inequality-
decreasing effect. The (overall) positive impact of human capital on inequality can instead
be explained again turning on the idea of absorptive capacity. It is in fact plausible that
increases in human capital may anticipate – rather than follow behind – trade in skilled-
intensive goods, and the setting-up of multinational firms specialised in skilled-intensive
production. The reason is that only when a sufficient level of absorptive capacity has
20 Replacing the human capital index with the ratio of workers having acquired tertiary education and all
other workers does not lead to significant results in other regressions we have conducted (not reported).
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been established in a DC, can both investment from abroad and the creation of trade-
oriented skilled-intensive activities be profitable21.
Another concurring explanation for the same piece of evidence is in terms of the
cones of diversification theory (see section 3.1.A). As a country’s workforce increases its
human capital and specialises in more skilled-intensive sectors, it is likely to suffer from
the competition of less developed countries. The import from these countries may thus
substitute domestic unskilled-intensive production, thus leading to further increases in
inequality. In the analysis presented in section 4.5, we show that this is indeed the case.
Finally, it is worth noting that coefficients for the terms for the GDP and GDP
square become significantly different from zero in all regressions including the
interaction term. However, the signs are opposite to those implied by a Kuznets
relationship.
4.4 The Inequality-Institutional factors link
As mentioned above, TE have been characterised by major institutional changes that
have gone along with the process of globalisation. In this section we shall try to
disentangle the relative importance of the two effects. We have used the same
econometric models as above to assess the impact of various institutional factors on
inequality.
First, the process of privatisation of State enterprises appears to have been
significantly correlated with inequality increases. The volume of revenues accruing to
governments from the selling of State enterprises – expressed as a ratio of GDP –
(PRIVATISATION REVENUES (GDP SHARE)) is positively related with inequality levels
(Table 5, column 1). A second institutional process that TE has gone through is that of
labour market liberalisation. We have used the share of workers over the total that is
employed in the private sector (PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT SHARE). This variable is able to
measure the switches of workers from the public sector to the private sector. This
variable, too, is strongly significant with a positive sign, and its elasticity is in fact the
highest among the various institutional factors (Table 5, column 3). A third institutional
factor is product market liberalisation. We have deployed the share of the private sector
into the overall value added produced by an economy as a proxy (PRIVATE SECTOR
21 It is worth noting that in other regressions we have conducted (not reported) the positive impact of
human capital on inequality occurs even for values of human capital lagged for several years.
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VALUE ADDED SHARE). This variable is also strongly significant and has a positive sign
(Table 5, column 5).
Moreover, we have analysed the interaction effects of these variables with our human
capital index. Consistently with the findings for the globalisation variables, some of these
institutional factors appear to exert the largest inequality-enhancing effects at the highest
levels of human capital, although this is strongly significant only for labour market
liberalisation. Even in this case, this is counterintuitive if one thinks at rises in skilled
labour supply as having primarily the effect of reducing the wage premium. However,
this result may be construed in terms of the ascending phase of a Kuznets-like curve (see
discussion in section 4.1), with skilled labour demand growing faster than skilled labour
supply. As a result, more skilled workers are associated with a higher number of high-
wage recipients in a phase of widening wage disparities, and thus higher overall
inequality. Whether increases in skilled labour force will lead to a decreasing trend in the
future remains to be seen.
The effect of state enterprises privatisation does not appear to be affected by the
composition of the workforce in terms of human capital, which may point to this sector
being still relatively sheltered from the rest of the economy in terms of skill premium
differentials (see Delteil et al., 2004, for the case of Hungary). Likewise, the interaction
term with human capital is only weakly significant for product market liberalisation.
We also wanted to investigate the capacity of the government in controlling
inequality through economic policy. The results of the analysis are reported in Table 6.
First, we looked at the monetary policy analysing the relationship between inequality and
inflation and the real interest rate. Inflation is strongly significant and has a positive sign
when entering the regression alone (Table 6, column 1). This may point to the fact that
inflation is associated with periods of high macroeconomic turbulence, with little control
of the government over the inequality variable. The real interest rate variable is not
significant when entered on its own (Table 6, column 2). However, when the two
variables enter the regression together, inflation remains significant but its sign becomes
negative (Table 6, column 3). This may be explained by thinking that the introduction of
the real interest rate helps to control explicitly for the macroeconomic turbulence
component, in particular for what concerns financial markets. As a result, once this effect
is sieved out, the component of inflation that is directed towards regulating the economy
can be discerned. The negative sign implies that inflationary policies may have been used
by governments to reduce inequality.
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We have kept both monetary policy variables in the regressions that analyse the fiscal
policy instruments. This is done in order to control for the effects of periods of
macroeconomic turbulence. Public expenditures seem to have been rather ineffective in
affecting inequality. The overall expenses in the public sector (GOVT. EXPENSES (GDP
SHARE)) – which include both investments and consumption - have a negative sign but
are not significant (Table 6, column 4). The public sector consumption component
(GOVT.GENERAL CONSUMPTION (GDP SHARE)) has instead a positive significant sign,
but it lacks statistical significance, too. What is more surprising, though, is that the
expenditures in social benefits (SOCIAL BENEFITS EXPENDITURES (GDP SHARE)) do have
a statistically significant impact on inequality, but this goes in the direction of increasing
inequality (Table 6, column 5). The same is true to the share of overall taxation over
GDP (TAXES REVENUES (GDP SHARE)) (Table 6, column 6) – and it could not be
otherwise given the high degree of correlation between the two variables, which exceeds
0.96.
One may think that an increase of the weight of the public sector in the economy has
been detrimental to these economies, and has thus led to further increases inequality.
More likely, in spite of the regressors entering the econometric model with a one-year
lag, it is possible that these results are due to co-variation or co-causation between
inequality and the fiscal variables, without any direct causality link between them. This is
especially likely to have been the case in the first phases of the liberalisation programmes,
where in some cases taxation massively increased. In the case of social benefits, the
positive sign of the relationship may simply reflect the fact that higher volumes of social
benefits had to be spent during periods of higher inequality. It also has to be stressed
that, being the GINI indexes we use mainly based on gross earnings (see Table 3), fiscal
policy is less likely to directly affect the measure of inequality than if a measure based on
disposable income were used. Even so, the analysis indicates a general inability of the
government in using fiscal policy to reduce inequality.
Table 7 enables us to analyse the relationship and the relative importance of trade
and institutional factors by introducing both variables as regressors. Firstly, privatisations
seem to have had an independent effect on inequality in relation with exports, but they
seem to mediate the impact of both imports and FDI. In fact, when these variables both
enter as regressors, imports and FDI are no longer significant (Table 7, columns 1, 2, 3).
The result for FDI is not surprising, and can be accounted for by the simultaneity with
which the two processes must have been conducted. Since a substantial part of the
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privatised capital went into foreign hands, the two variables are likely to be strictly
correlated. What is more surprising is instead the loss of significance of the Import
variable. An interpretation for this result may be derived from Barlow and Radulescu
(2005), who argue that trade liberalisation promotes privatisation because the reduction
in rent seeking facilitates the entry of small businesses into trading activities. As in the
case of FDI, if the processes happened simultaneously, only one variable would retain a
significant impact in our regression. However, their result only applies to small-scale
privatisation rather than large-scale one, where the governments are more likely to have
cashed in substantial amounts of revenues. Most importantly, one would expect to find
that parallel results for Exports and Imports – which are nevertheless not separated out
in Barlow and Radulescu’s analysis. Instead, Exports remain significant, and in fact their
elasticity is more than twice as great as that of privatisation (see Table 7, column 1). More
analysis is needed on this issue.
Secondly, both Exports and Imports lose significance when matched with our
product market liberalisation proxy, that is, the value added in the private sector as a
share of the GDP (Table 7: columns 4, 5). This result clearly points to the fact that
increased trade has been closely associated with the expansion of the domestic private
sector, and the associated rise in profits. Conversely, FDI maintain a significant and
positive effect on inequality, though only weakly. This points to a different timing of FDI
and the expansion of the domestic private sector (Table 7: column 6).
Finally, all globalisation variables regain a significant impact on inequality when
matched with our proxy for labour market liberalisation, that is, the share of workers
employed in the private sector. The latter variable, too, remains strongly significant and
positive (Table 7: column 7-9). This result points to the fact that, unlike the previous two
institutional variables, labour market liberalisation and globalisation variables have had
largely independent influences on inequality. This is surprising because globalisation
processes clearly impinged more upon private rather than public employment, so one
would expect that their impact of inequality varied in relation to different degrees of
liberalisation in the former. Even in this case, a more in-depth analysis is needed,
although admittedly this puzzling result may be due to the indicator used being an
imperfect proxy for labour market liberalisation.
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4.5 Comparing the performance of EU New Member States with
that of other countries
The second goal of this paper is to analyse the relevance of the process leading to
join the EU on a country’s economic performance. Ideally, the questions we would like
to answer are: ‘In which measure has joining the EU helped a country in attaining a
better performance with respect to inequality?’ and ‘How differently have the various
mechanisms of inequality illustrated above affected the set of EU-accession countries vis-
à-vis the others?’ The first question can only be addressed indirectly within our dataset,
because we do not have a variable measuring explicitly the degree of institutional
integration with the EU. In what follows we shall mainly deal with the second question,
although some tentative conclusions may be drawn for the first question, too.
Firstly, we have tried to assess whether trading with the EU may have had an
inequality-enhancing effect. Since trade generally exerts an important influence on
inequality, we construct an index given by the ratio between trade with the EU and that
with the US. As the US is a country comparable to the EU in terms of level of
development and technological advancement, this index captures the specificity of
trading with the EU in relation to a similarly advanced country. This index of EU Trade
has a significant positive influence on inequality for both Exports (EU/US EXPORTS) and
Imports (EU/US IMPORTS) (Table 8, columns 1, 3). Moreover, this is true in particular for
NMS, rather than the CIS & SEE (Table 8, columns 2, 4).
This result may point to a specific inequality-enhancing effect of trading with the
EU, in relation to the trading with another developed country like the US, which holds in
particular for NMS. This may be due to the fact that the regulations imposed by the EU
in terms of commodities characteristics and production processes, which applied in
particular to NMS, forced these countries to skill-intensive technology innovations that
had an inequality-enhancing effect. Likewise, NMS may have been prompted to import
capital machinery from EU in order to fulfil this requirement, which might account for
the positive impact of imports from the EU on inequality. Further research is needed to
clarify the underlying mechanisms of these effects.
It is also interesting to note that imports from other DCs have had an inequality-
enhancing effect (Table 8, column 7), which is uniform across the two sets of countries
(Table 8, columns 8). This is consistent with the idea that TE have a ‘cone of
diversification’ typical of middle-income countries (see section 2), so that imports of
unskilled-intensive commodities from DCs crowd out domestic production of the same
commodities, thus increasing inequality. According to the results presented in section 4.3,
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it is also likely that TE acquired this position only gradually through time, because the
observed negative impact of inequality for low levels of human capital appears typical of
unskilled-labour abundant countries. Exports to DCs do not seem to have significant
effects (Table 8, columns 5, 6).
Whether the different mechanisms of inequality had different effects in the two
groups of countries is investigated in Table 9. The variable of interest here is the
interaction term between the NMS dummy and the relevant variable. This would signal a
significant effect in one group with respect to the other. The only case in which this is
the case is for FDI (Table 9, column 3), which indicates that FDI had a significantly
larger inequality effect in the NMS rather than in the CIS & SEE. However, no
significant effect can be found for the other variables.
The absence of a significant difference between the two sets of countries may be
considered puzzling. Inequality has grown faster in the latter group, so one may perhaps
have expected that some of the mechanisms analysed had a wider impact in the CIS &
SEE in comparison to the NMS. In fact, this does not turn out to be the case in our
analysis. There may two explanations for this result.
Firstly, one may think that the mechanisms considered had a larger scale effect in the
CIS & SEE vis-à-vis the NMS, but did not have a different marginal effect. That is,
opening to trade may per se have a larger impact on inequality in CIS, but acceleration in
trade may lead to similar results in the groups of countries. This would be consistent with
the results we find. One may for instance think that a lack of governance capacity by CIS
countries may be responsible for this larger scale effect in CIS & SEE. That is, opening
to trade may rise ceteris paribus more inequality in this group because of a lower
governance quality in these States. However, other analyses we have conducted (not
reported) using indicators of corruption, political stability, governance effectiveness, do
not show any significant differences between the two sets of countries.
An alternative explanation is that the higher inequality growth is not linked
specifically to the mechanisms we have analysed, but rather to the sectoral structural
adjustments processes reported in section 3.3. In particular, the specialisation of some of
the CIS economies into the extractive sector may have caused a one-off increase in
inequality, which is not further affected by acceleration in trade. Even in this case, a more
in-depth analysis is required to fully unravel these issues.
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5 Conclusions
The purpose of this paper has been to analyse the causes of inequality for the set of
TE that emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union. In particular, we showed that
both sets of causes that may be referred to as economic globalisation – namely, import,
export, and FDI – and institutional factors – namely, privatisation reforms, labour
market liberalisation, and product market liberalisation – are strongly correlated with
within-country inequality increases. The conjoint analysis of the two sets of factors has
helped gain some insight on the relationship between the two sets of factors. In all cases,
the institutional factors maintain their significant impact on inequality even when coupled
with globalisation factors, whereas in some cases this is not true for the latter. This does
not necessarily point to a better explanatory power of institutional factors, but more
likely signals that some of the globalisation mechanisms of inequality were ‘by-passed’ by
domestic institutional reforms in order to show their effects on inequality.
In order to gain a better understanding of the possible mechanisms that triggered
inequality, we have also introduced an index of the level of human capital of the
workforce into the analysis. The results point to the existence of a significant interaction
between such a measure and the globalisation factors in particular. First of all, the impact
of globalisation has an inequality-decreasing (increasing) effect at low (high) levels of
human capital. This points to the existence of two different ‘regimes’ of globalisation,
being its impact consistent with the SS theorem at low levels of human capital, and with
the alternative SET hypothesis at high levels. Secondly, human capital appears to exert a
uniformly positive effect on inequality at different stages of globalisation. This points to
the relevance of a country’s absorptive capacity in triggering the processes of
technological spillovers through the international channel, and to the progressive shift in
the ‘cone of diversification’ in international trade. Similar effects are also observed when
interacting human capital with institutional factors, although at smaller significance level
and less comprehensively.
We also tested the impact of integration with the Europe Union by studying the
effect of an index that normalises trade with the EU with trade with the US. The results
clearly point to a significant inequality-enhancing effect of this index, which may
accounted for in terms o a skill-biased technological upgrade that countries joining the
EU had to undertake. Finally, policy variables have somehow counter-intuitive effects,
which may be suggestive of the inability of these countries in controlling their economic
policy instruments.
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Table 3: Sources for Gini Indexes
Country Mean Std.Dev. Max Min Source Definition
Albania 44.68 9.82 57.93 30.69 EHII *
Armenia 52.91 4.99 57.18 47.26 EHII *
Azerbaijan 40.88 3.29 45.68 37.71 EHII *
Belarus 35.30 1.95 40.00 34.00 WIDER Gross Earnings
Bulgaria 38.02 4.97 43.34 27.34 EHII *
Croatia 34.41 2.54 37.10 30.05 EHII *
Czech Republic 25.58 2.16 28.20 21.20 WIDER Gross Earnings
Estonia 36.76 1.44 38.90 35.30 WIDER Disposable Income
Hungary 37.29 3.00 40.01 31.57 EHII *
Kyrgyz Republic 43.82 5.55 51.00 30.00 WIDER Gross Earnings
Latvia 32.26 2.90 34.90 24.70 WIDER Gross Earnings
Lithuania 36.98 1.64 39.00 34.50 WIDER Gross Earnings
Macedonia 26.38 1.94 29.00 22.00 WIDER Net Earnings
Moldova 41.10 2.28 44.00 38.00 WIDER Gross Earnings
Poland 31.76 2.95 35.30 26.50 WIDER Disposable Income
Romania 32.55 6.90 41.00 20.00 WIDER Gross Earnings
Russian Federation 42.56 8.53 52.00 27.00 WIDER Gross Earnings
Serbia and Montenegro 32.00 5.10 38.00 27.00 WIDER Disposable Income
Slovak Republic 23.57 3.55 26.70 18.00 WIDER Disposable Income
Slovenia 29.25 3.16 35.80 22.80 WIDER Gross Earnings
Ukraine 36.80 4.75 42.36 29.88 EHII *
Notes: The EHII is a collection of measures of Estimated Household Income Inequality and is built combining the information in the Deninger and Squire (D&S) data with the
information in the UTIP-UNIDO data. In the D&S data Gini coefficients originate from different sources refer to a variety of different income and population definitions.
The EHII is built following a two-step procedure. First, the D&S measure of inequality (in Gini coefficients) is regressed on the UTIP-UNIDO measures of income dispersion
in manufacturing sector, and on a matrix of conditioning variables including dummies for the three types of data source (income/expenditure, household/per capita,
gross/net). Then EHII is computed using the same exogenous variables, where the intercept and coefficients are the deterministic parts extracted from the first-step
estimation. The UTIP-UNIDO Database is assembled by the University of Texas Inequality Project (UTIP) and includes two measures of inequality. See Galbraith and Kum
(2003) for a detailed explanation of this procedure.
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Table 4: Impact of globalisation on inequality
1 2 3 4 5 6
Constant 10.24** 77.05*** 4.616 62.05*** 5.59 -6.101
4.8 15.5 4.42 14.7 5.82 22.1
GDP -1.599 -16.31*** -0.363 -12.99*** -0.457 2.057
1.1 3.38 1.02 3.2 1.3 4.84
GDP SQUARE 0.0863 0.893*** 0.0163 0.707*** 0.0253 -0.109
0.063 0.18 0.059 0.17 0.072 0.27
EXPORTS 0.166*** 0.243***
0.045 0.061
IMPORTS 0.212*** 0.307***
0.046 0.075
FDI 0.0407*** 0.0619***
0.0047 0.015
HUMAN CAPITAL INDEX -1.575*** -1.111** 0.345***
0.43 0.45 0.082
INTERACTION EXPORT - HUMAN CAPITAL INDEX 0.559***
0.12
INTERACTION IMPORTS - HUMAN CAPITAL INDEX 0.425***
0.13
INTERACTION FDI - HUMAN CAPITAL INDEX 0.0392**
0.016
Observations 205 96 205 96 150 66
Number of country 20 9 20 9 19 9
R-squared 0.11 0.52 0.18 0.48 0.36 0.69
Notes: See section 4.2 for sources and description of the dataset. Robust standard errors are reported under the coefficient estimates.
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Table 5: Impact of institutional factors on inequality
1 2 3 4 5 6
Constant 1.333 -32.07* 10.44 -60.25** 1.19 10.1
5.72 18.2 7.09 24 4 18.7
GDP 0.681 7.938* -1.866 13.72** 0.347 -1.636
1.31 4.01 1.58 5.28 0.9 4.05
GDP SQUARE -0.0492 -0.444* 0.111 -0.751** -0.0173 0.09
0.075 0.22 0.087 0.29 0.05 0.22
PRIVATISATION REVENUES (GDP SHARE) 0.0613*** 0.0901***
0.013 0.013
PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT SHARE 0.226*** 0.323***
0.026 0.043
PRIVATE SECTOR VALUE ADDED SHARE 0.172*** 0.225***
0.014 0.027
HUMAN CAPITAL INDEX -0.124 0.199 0.106
0.25 0.16 0.13
INTERACTION PRIVATISATION - HUMAN CAPITAL 0.00297
0.0053
INTERACTION PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT - HUMAN CAPITAL 0.00603***
0.002
INTERACTION PRIVATE VALUE ADDED - HUMAN CAPITAL 0.00459*
0.0023
Observations 145 61 127 66 194 84
Number of country 19 9 17 8 20 9
R-squared 0.34 0.63 0.44 0.68 0.61 0.72
Notes: See section 4.2 for sources and description of the dataset. Robust standard errors are reported under the coefficient estimates.
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Table 6: Impact of economic policy on inequality
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Constant 10.72** 5.874 6.955 -5.426 4.537 -4.952 -4.372
4.58 9.1 9.07 17.4 9.06 8.89 8.09
GDP -1.646 -0.659 -0.763 2.178 -0.827 1.812 1.681
1.06 2.03 2.01 3.84 1.99 1.97 1.81
GDP SQUARE 0.0925 0.0442 0.0429 -0.129 0.0454 -0.0945 -0.0878
0.061 0.11 0.11 0.21 0.11 0.11 0.1
INFLATION 0.0194*** -0.0181** -0.0270** -0.0123 0.0146 0.0123
0.0047 0.0089 0.013 0.01 0.011 0.013
REAL INTEREST RATE 0.00281 -0.00052 0.000563 0.00043 0.0292*** 0.0298**
0.0089 0.0086 0.02 0.0093 0.0086 0.012
GOVT. EXPENSES (GDP SHARE) -0.00892
0.15
GOVT.GENERAL CONSUMPTION (GDP SHARE) 0.128
0.084
SOCIAL BENEFITS EXPENDITURES (GDP SHARE) 0.0483***
0.0094
TAXES REVENUES (GDP SHARE) 0.0652***
0.019
Observations 199 88 87 40 85 66 66
Number of country 20 18 18 12 18 15 15
R-squared 0.12 0.08 0.11 0.16 0.13 0.4 0.36
Notes: See section 4.2 for sources and description of the dataset. Robust standard errors are reported under the coefficient estimates.
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Table 7: Joint impact of globalisation and institutional variables on inequality
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Constant -4.128 -3.755 -0.837 -0.928 -1.043 4.748 5.054 2.452 5.609
4.27 4.11 -4.75 3.97 4.21 4.06 4.46 4.1 6.67
GDP 1.828* 1.784* 1.225 0.915 0.969 -0.346 -0.618 -0.0297 -0.588
0.98 0.95 -1.08 0.9 0.94 0.92 1 0.91 1.48
GDP SQUARE -0.113** -0.111** -0.0825 -0.0535 -0.057 0.0177 0.0396 0.00342 0.0353
0.056 0.054 -0.061 0.051 0.053 0.052 0.056 0.051 0.081
EXPORTS 0.106*** 0.0245 0.0909**
0.038 0.035 0.042
IMPORTS 0.0575 -0.00532 0.140***
0.055 0.042 0.038
FDI -0.00028 0.0127* 0.0249**
-0.0082 0.007 0.012
PRIVATISATION REVENUES (GDP
SHARE) 0.0469*** 0.0480*** 0.0538***
0.0082 0.0091 -0.0096
PRIVATE SECTOR VALUE ADDED SHARE 0.136*** 0.140*** 0.122***
0.015 0.015 0.025
PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT SHARE 0.128*** 0.138*** 0.0877***
0.018 0.015 0.023
Observations 129 129 124 183 183 145 117 117 103
Number of country 19 19 19 20 20 19 16 16 15
R-squared 0.38 0.33 0.34 0.53 0.53 0.41 0.43 0.46 0.28
Notes: See section 4.2 for sources and description of the dataset. Robust standard errors are reported under the coefficient estimates.
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Table 8: Impact of Trade Patterns in NMS and CIS & SEE
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Constant 6.962* 6.733* 7.873** 7.683* 8.356* 8.309* 5.521 4.126
3.53 3.96 3.91 4.02 5 4.96 4.77 4.81
GDP -0.768 -0.656 -1.013 -0.883 -1.049 -1.035 -0.447 -0.0598
0.8 0.9 0.89 0.92 1.13 1.12 1.08 1.1
GDP SQUARE 0.0451 0.0353 0.06 0.0483 0.0575 0.0561 0.0231 -0.00415
0.046 0.051 0.051 0.052 0.064 0.064 0.061 0.063
EU/US EXPORTS 0.175*** 0.0456
0.028 0.035
INT. EU/US EXPORTS - NMS 0.254***
0.042
EU/US IMPORTS 0.106*** 0.0365
0.025 0.022
INT. EU/US IMPORTS - NMS 0.289***
0.067
EXPORTS TO DCs 0.0255 -0.0345
0.031 0.04
INT. EXPORTS TO DCs - NMS 0.035
0.068
IMPORTS FROM DCs 0.0528** 0.0207
0.022 0.023
INT. IMPORTS FROM DCs - NMS 0.122
0.077
Observations 183 183 183 183 176 176 176 176
Number of country 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
R-squared 0.32 0.48 0.17 0.38 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.07
Notes: See section 4.2 for sources and description of the dataset. Robust standard errors are reported under the coefficient estimates.
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Table 9: Impact of globalisation and institutional factors in NMS and CIS & SEE
1 2 3 4 5 6
Constant 10.01** 4.909 3.685 0.956 1.324 9.195
4.8 4.31 5.36 6.21 3.97 8.5
GDP -1.549 -0.423 -0.0234 0.818 0.321 -1.572
1.1 1 1.2 1.43 0.89 1.9
GDP SQUARE 0.0829 0.0191 0.000716 -0.06 -0.0161 0.0942
0.063 0.058 0.067 0.082 0.05 0.11
EXPORTS 0.115**
0.053
ExpLag_NMS 0.103
0.09
IMPORTS 0.189***
0.062
ImpLag_NMS 0.0496
0.097
FDI 0.0133
0.0099
FdiLag_NMS 0.0353***
0.011
PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT SHARE 0.134
0.096
PRIVATE EMPLOYMEN SHARE_NMS 0.114
0.1
PRIVATE SECTOR VALUE ADDED SHARE 0.169***
0.017
PRIVATE SECTOR VALUE ADDED SHARE_NMS 0.00577
0.028
PRIVATISATION REVENUES (GDP SHARE) 0.0422**
0.021
PRIVATISATION REVENUES (GDP SHARE)_NMS 0.0319
0.024
Observations 205 205 150 145 194 127
Number of country 20 20 19 19 20 17
R-squared 0.12 0.18 0.41 0.36 0.61 0.45
Notes: See section 4.2 for sources and description of the dataset. Robust standard errors are reported under the coefficient estimator.
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